Philosophical Posthumanism and Intentionality

Abstract

In this paper I defend the importance of Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” for Philosophical Posthumanism vis-à-vis humanism. After first establishing the role of intentionality in humanism, I move to a critique of that role from the perspective of both ontology and the history of scientific explanation. Rendering intentionality deeply problematic for humanism, thereby acting in support of Philosophical Posthumanism, I argue that this critique may ultimately be too strong for Philosophical Posthumanism itself. This is because it leads to eliminativism and reductionism. I conclude by arguing that Philosophical Posthumanism needs the more
inclusive approach to intentionality found in Dennett’s intentional stance. It does so, but only on a pragmatic interpretation. Without that interpretation, Dennett’s work, and thus its application to Philosophical Posthumanism, falls victim to the very same critique levelled against intentionality in relation to humanism.